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Abstract
This article presents a new capital structure model based on four
factors well documented in literature: asymmetric information, taxes,
bankruptcy costs and decision-makers overcondence. The model can
simultaneously explain several facts about capital structure including
those that remain puzzling from existing theories point of view eg.
negative correlation between debt and protability; why rms issue
equity etc. Unlike many advanced research on capital structure, a
closed-form solution is obtained for most results.
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1 Introduction
The modern theory of capital structure began with the famous proposition of
Modigliani and Miller (1958) that described the conditions of capital struc-
ture irrelevance. Since then, many nancial economists have altered these
conditions to explain the factors driving capital structure decisions.1
For useful comments and editing assistance I would like to thank Mohammed Abdel-
laoui, Xiehua (Richard) Ji, Antony Dnes, Don Johnson, Victor Miglo, Daniel Spulber and
the seminar participants at De Montfort University, University of Brighton, Edinburgh
Napier University and Ulster University.
yCorresponding author, Birmingham City University, anton.miglo@bcu.ac.uk.
1For a review of major capital structure theories see, among others, Harris and Raviv
(1991) and Miglo (2011, 2016).
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Pecking-order theory (POT) suggests that there is pecking order where
rms issue equity only as last resort (Myers and Majluf (1984)). The main
drawback of this theory is that despite suggested pecking order, many rms
issue equity even when they have other options available (Frank and Goyal
(2003), Leary and Roberts (2010)). Another asymmetric information based
theory is signalling theory. It suggests that good quality rms should use
debt as a signal of quality. The major shortcoming of this theory is that
it is not consistent with negative correlation between debt and protability
well documented in literature (Titman and Wessles (1988), Frank and Goyal
(2008)).
Trade-o¤ theory of capital structure (TOT) focuses on two factors. Cor-
porate income tax creates a tax shiled for companies that use debt. Secondly,
rms that use debt are facing some probability of bankruptcy which is costly.
Optimal capital structure is based on the trade-o¤ between the benets of tax
shield and expected bankruptcy costs (Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)). The
major shortcoming of this theory is that it is not consistent with mentioned
previously negative correlation between debt and protability.
Behavioral nance theory of capital structure assumes that managers
overestimate the value of their projects and as such they would rather issue
debt than equity because the latter is more sensitive to earnings uncertainty
and estimation biases (Fairchild (2005)). In most cases these conclusions are
similar to mentioned above pecking-order theory.
In last 20 years dynamic versions of TOT and POT have been created (eg
Morellec (2004), Miglo (2012)). Dynamic extensions of TOT do not often
have a closed-form solution. Dynamic extensions of POT often lack empirical
support to the best of our knowledge.
Finally note that Graham and Harvey (2001) report a large gap between
capital structure theory and practice.
In this article we suggest a new model of capital structure which combines
elements of all mentioned above approaches. Unlike many modern advanced
studies on capital structure it generates a closed-form solution for most re-
sults. These results are consistent with most well-known results about capital
structure.
In our model a rm owned by an entrepreneur has an investment project
and decides whether to use debt or equity to nance the project. The rm is
subject to corporate income tax. In the case of default there are bankruptcy
costs. Entrepreneur has private information about project quality. Finally
entrepreneur can be biased in estimating project results. We rst consider
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cases where only one factor is present (eg asymmetric information) and other
factors are ignored. These variations of the model can produce some results
regarding capital structure choice which are consistent with empirical evi-
dence but at the same time in most cases they have some major drawbacks.
For example, when considering separately the e¤ect of asymmetric infro-
mation, the model predicts that equilibrium is either pooling woth debt or
separating where high-quality rms issue debt and low-quality rms issue
equity which is generally consistent with traditional asymmetric information
theories and which have problems discussed above.
We next analyze a model where all factors are present simultaneously. In
this case the model generates a large number of predictions regarding capital
structure largely consistent with observed evidence. Among model results
note the following: debt/equity ratio is positively correlated with rm size
and tax rate; it is negativley correlated with rm protability and bankruptcy
costs; good rms may issue equity in equilibrium; overcondence is positively
correlated with debt etc.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a litera-
ture review. Section 3 presents the basic model and its main results. Section
4 considers the main case where all factors are present simultaneously. Sec-
tion 5 discusses the models implications and its consistency with empirical
evidence. Section 6 discusses model assumptions and possible extensions and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review.
2.1 Capital Structure Under Asymmetric Information
Myers and Majluf (1984) set forth POT. The key element of this theory is
asymmetric information between rms insiders and outsiders. POT predicts
that equity should only be used as a last resort. Firms issuing equity will be
undervalued. Consequently only rms with low expected performance may
issue equity. Equity is dominated by internal funds and debt in this model.
Debt su¤ers from misvaluation less than equity. The empirical evidence on
pecking order theory is mixed. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Lemmon
and Zender (2010), and a survey of New York Stock Exchange rms by
Kamath (1997) nd support for pecking order while Chirinko and Singha
(2000), Frank and Goyal (2003) and Leary and Roberts (2010) do not.
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Similarly signaling theory (Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977)) usually
suggests that high-quality rms issue debt and low-quality rms issue equity.
The empirical prediction is that rm value (or protability) and the debt-
to-equity ratio is positively related. The evidence, however, is ambiguous.
Most empirical studies report a negative relationship between leverage and
protability as discussed earlier. In a similar spirit, some studies document
the superior absolute performance of equity-issuing rms before and imme-
diately after the issue (Jain and Kini (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1997)).
Finally the evidence on the announcement of debt issues does not support
signaling theories. Eckbo (1986) as well as Antweiler and Frank (2006) nd
insignicant changes in stock prices in response to straight corporate debt
issues.
Some asymmetric information-based ideas exist as to why managers of
high-quality rms may use leverage-decreasing transactions as a signal. These
include issuing equity to signal low variance of earnings (Brick, Frierman, and
Kim (1998)), retiring existing debt to signal earnings quality (Brennan and
Kraus (1987)), signaling based on a model that combines asymmetric infor-
mation with agency problems (Noe and Rebello (1996)) and issuing equity to
signal a high level of expected short-term earnings as compared to long-term
earnings (Miglo (2007, 2017). Empirical support for these ideas is limited.
A challenge for researchers today is to nd a model that can explain several
major empirical phenomena simultaneously.
2.2 Taxes and Bankruptcy Costs
In contrast to dividends, interest paid on debt reduces the rms taxable in-
come. Debt also increases the probability of bankruptcy. TOT suggests that
capital structure reects a trade-o¤ between the tax benets of debt and the
expected costs of bankruptcy (Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)). TOT also
suggests that if protability increases, debt should also increase. Therefore
more protable rms should have more debt. Expected bankruptcy costs are
lower and interest tax shields are more valuable for protable rms. Empiri-
cal evidence on TOT is mixed. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Barclay, Morellec,
and Smith (2006), and Frank and Goyal (2009) generally support some of its
prediction. However, the major shortcoming is that empirical studies typi-
cally nd a negative relationship between protability and leverage (Titman
and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002),
Frank and Goyal (2009)).
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Dynamic versions of TOT suggest several ideas that can improve the
drawbacks of traditional theory (Hennessy and Whited (2005), Ju, Parrino,
Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005), Strebulaev (2007), Tserlukevichs (2008),
Morellec (2004), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), Cook and Kieschnick (2009)).
Dynamic trade-o¤ models are likely to provide an important contribution to
TOT. Empirical results and simulated results apparently dominate theoreti-
cal results. New theoretical results are expected.
2.3 Behavioural Finance and Capital Structure
Fairchild (2005) examines the combined e¤ects of managerial overcondence,
asymmetric information andmoral hazard problems on the managers debt/equity
choice. In particular it argues that rms issue too much debt and rm prof-
its are reduced. Although it provides some intersting results, in terms of
capital structure choice, the results are mostly consistent with traditional
asymmetric information based theories where equity is not issued. Unlike in
Fairchild (2005), managers are not equally overcondent in our model. No
other existing paper seems to be able to explain why rms may be interested
in issuing equity and do not compare performance of rms issuing debt and
equity.
3 Basic Model.
Consider a rm with an investment project. The project costs B. In the case
of success it generates earnings X. Earnings equal 0 in the case of failure.2
The probability of success is p. The rm belongs to an entrepreneur who
owns 100% of the rms equity. The entrepreneur can undertake the project
by issuing debt or equity. Everybody is risk-neutral and risk-free interest rate
is normalized to zero. The investors provide funds as long as the expected
earnings cover their cost and the entrepreneur maximizes his expected prots.
Also, the entrepreneur has private information about project quality. More
specically, there are two types of rms, high (h) and low quality (l). For
a high-quality rm the project generates an amount of earnings Xh in the
case success and for low-quality rm it generates Xl with Xl < Xh. The
fraction of high-quality rms is  2 (0; 1). In addition, entrepreneur can be
2In Section 6, we discuss the models robustness with reagrd to di¤erent assumptions
made.
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overcondent, i.e. he thinks that the amount of earnings from the project
equals Xi+ "i where "i reects the degree of the entrepreneurs bias, i = l; h.
"i > 0 means that the entrepreneur is overcondent, "i = 0 means that the
entrepreneur is unbiased (rational). Also the rm is subject to corporate
income tax. The corporate income tax rate is denoted by t. In the case of
bankruptcy there are bankruptcy costs C.
The timing of events is present in Figure 1.
-
t = 1 t = 2
s s
A rm is considering
to undertake an investment





The rm choses between
debt and equity
Investment is made
Earnings from the project are realized
and distributed among
all claimholders according to
issued securities
Figure 1. The sequence of events.
We start by considering the case without taxes (t = 0) and bankruptcy
costs (C = 0) as well as with rational entrepreneurs ("h = "l = 0) and
symmetric information (Xh = Xl = X), i.e. all parties share the same
information and all variables are public knowledge.
If debt is selected (we will denote this decision/strategy by d for short-
ness), the entrepreneurs expected prot equals
p(X   F ) (1)
where F is the face value of debt. The entrepreneurs expected prot from the
project equals the probability of success multiplied by the di¤erence between
earnings from the project in a good scenario and face value of the debt.
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If equity is selected (this strategy is denoted by e), the entrepreneurs
prot is
(1  )pX (2)
where  is the fraction of equity sold to new shareholders.
Lemma 1. If information is symmetric and entrepreneurs are rational
then in the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs: 1) if pX  B, the project
is worthless for the rm; 2) otherwise the rm is indi¤erent between debt and
equity nancing.
Proof. Under strategy e, the fraction of shares that has to be sold is
determined by the following condition:
pX = B (3)




)pX = pX  B (4)
Under strategy d, the face value of debt is determined by the following con-
dition:





The rst condition means that the face value of debt should not be greater
than the amount of earnings the rm earns if the projects succeeds and the
second condition means that the expected earnings that the bank is going
to receive covers their investment/loan. They can hold simultaneously if the
project has positive net present value or:
pX > B (7)




) = pX  B (8)
(4) and (8) are equal.
This result (see also Table 1) is not surprising. It is conisistent with
the spirit of classical literature on rm nancial decision-making in a perfect
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market (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). Finally note that if (7) does not hold,
project is worthless for the rm under any type of nancing.
Table 1. The model predictions
Conditions Prediction
no tax Capital structure
no bankruptcy costs is irrelevant
no asymmetric information
entrepreneurs are fully rational
3.1 Taxes and Bankruptcy Costs
Now suppose that entrepreneurs are still rational and information is still
symmetric but the rm pays corporate income tax and there are bankruptcy
costs. If e is selected, the entrepreneurs prot is
(1  )pX(1  t) (9)
The fraction of shares that has to be sold is determined by the following
condition:
pX(1  t) = B (10)




)pX(1  t) = pX(1  t) B (11)
If d is selected, the entrepreneurs expected prot equals
p(X   F )(1  t)  C(1  p) (12)
Here C(1  p) are the expcted bankruptcy costs. Also F = B=p. Substi-




)(1  t)  C(1  p) = (pX  B)(1  t)  C(1  p)






Lemma 2. If C > tB
1 p
, the entrepreneur prefers e to d and vice versa.
If C = tB
1 p
, the entrepreneur is indi¤erent between e and d.
Proof. Follows from above.
Lemma 2 (see also Table 2) is conisistent with the spirit of traditional
literature related to trade-o¤ theory of capital structure (Kraus and Litzen-
berger (1973), Titman and Wessles (1988), Frank and Goyal (2009) etc.). It
implies that debt is positively correlated with rm size (B) and tax rate (t);
it is negatively correlated with rm protability (p) and bankruptcy costs
(C). The shortcoming of this theory is the negative correlation between
debt and protability well documented in existing literature as we discussed
previously.
Table 2. The model predictions
Conditions Result Predictions
tax If C > tB
1 p
debt is positively correlated:
bankruptcy costs e is better than d - with tax rate
no asymmetric information If C < tB
1 p
- with protability
entrepreneurs are fully rational d is better than e - with rm size
debt is negatively correlated
with bankruptcy costs
3.2 Asymmetric information
Now assume that rm does not pay any tax and there is no bankruptcy
cost but asymmetric information exists between entrepreneurs and investors
regarding the value of X. An equilibrium is dened as a situation where
no rm type has an incentive to deviate. In the case of separating equi-
librium rms select di¤erent strategies and in the case of pooling equilibria
both types of rms select the same strategy. We will also check that the
o¤-equilibrium beliefs of market participants survive the intuitive criterion
by Cho-Kreps (1987). This condition means that the market o¤-equilibrium
beliefs are reasonable in the sense that if for any rm type its maximal pay-
o¤ from deviation is not greater than its equilibrium payo¤ then the market
should place the probability 0 on possible deviations of this type. The de-
nitions above are consistent with the standard perfect bayesian equilibrium
denition (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) with the addition of
an intuitive criterion that is quite common in these types of games (see, for
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instance, Nachman and Noe, 1994). Under asymmetric information, some
good quality projects may sustain losses compared to perfect information
case because of unfavorable market conditions (adverse selection). So if mul-
tiple equilibria exist we will use the mispricing criterion to indicate the one
that is most likely to exist. We use the standard concept of mispricing that
can be found, for example, in Nachman and Noe (1994). The magnitude
of mispricing in a given equilibrium is equal to that of undervalued type(s).
The overvaluation of overvalued type(s) does not matter.
4 possible equilbria should be considered: pooling where both types of
rm select d; pooling where both types select e; separating equilibrium where
h selects d and l selects e and separating where h selects e and l selects d.
Consider pooling with d. For this to be an equilibrium entrepreneurs with










where offe denote the market o¤-equilibrium belief about the probability for











O¤-equilibriummarket beliefs that support this equilibrium are as follows:
offe = 0 (15)
If offe > 0, (14) does not hold, i.e. low-quality rm would deviate to
strategy e. Such beliefs are generally consistent with singalling literature
(Brennan and Kraus (1987)) and they also satisfy the intuitive criterion.3 In








3Indeed, if offe > 0, type l payo¤ would be higher than its equilibrium payo¤ because
Xh > Xl so 
off
e = 0 are considered as reasonable beliefs from intuitive criterion point of
view (Cho and Kreps (1987)). The same will be used in other pooling equilibria (we will









Then condition (17) holds. Similarly (16) holds because Xh > Xl.







pXh + (1  )pXl
)pXh (18)






pXh + (1  )pXl
)pXl (19)
(19) does not hold because Xh > Xl.
Consider a separating equilibrium where h selects e and l selects d. Again,
















(21) does not hold because Xh > Xl.
Finally, consider a separating equilibrium where h selects d and l selects
















Condition (23) holds. (22) holds because Xh > Xl.
Lemma 3. When entrepreneurs are rational but information between
entrepreneurs and investors is asymmetric, equilibrium is pooling with d or
separating one where h selects d and l selects e.
Proof. Follows from above. Note that both equilibria survive the misprc-
ing criterion because the payo¤s of type h are equal in each case.
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Lemma 3 (see also Table 3) is generally consistent with signalling and
pecking order models (Leland and Pyle (1977) andMyers andMajlu¤ (1984)).
Also it predicts a positive correlation between debt and rm performance
which is usually not conrmed empirically (Titman and Wessels (1988)).
Table 3. The model predictions
Conditions Result Predictions
no tax Pooling equilibrium debt dominates equity
no bankruptcy costs with d or separating high-quality rms
asymmetric information where h selects d do not issue equity
entrepreneurs are fully rational and l selects e
3.3 Biased entrepreneurs.
Now suppose that information is symmetric, i.e the market particpants know
the rms type however the entrepreneur is overcondent, i.e. he thinks that
the projects earnings are X + ". First consider the case without tax and
bankruptcy costs.
Lemma 4. If " > 0, the entrepreneur prefers d.
Proof. If e is selected, the entrepreneurs expected earnings (from his
point of view) equals
(1  )(X + ") (24)
The fraction of shares that has to be sold is determined by the following
condition:
pX = B (25)




)p(X + ") (26)
If d is selected, then, objectively, the entrepreneurs prot equals Wd =
X   F . The entrepreneur, however, thinks that it is X + "   F . Since









then optimal strategy is d.
Lemma 4 is generally consistent with the spirit of existing literature on
capital structure that uses behavioural nance (eg. Fairchild (2005)).
Now consider the case with tax and bankruptcy costs.
Lemma 5. 1) If " > (1 p)CX
B
  tX, the entrepreneur prefers d to e and
vice versa; 2) if " = (1 p)CX
B
  tX, the entrepreneur is indi¤erent between d
and e.
Proof. If e is selected, the entrepreneurs expected earnings (from his
point of view) equals
(1  )(X + ")(1  t) (28)
The fraction of shares that has to be sold is determined by the following
condition:
pX(1  t) = B (29)




)p(X + ")(1  t) (30)




)(1  t)  (1  p)C






then optimal strategy is d and vice versa.
Table 4. The model predictions
Conditions Result Predictions
tax if " > (1 p)CX
B
  tX overcondence is
bankruptcy costs d is better than e positively
no asymmetric information if " < (1 p)CX
B
  tX correlated with
overcondence e is better than d debt
One interpretation of Lemma 5 (see also Table 4) is that if the degree
of entrepreneurial overcondence is comparatively high, then he would think
that the share price is too low and he would prefer debt. This is generally
consistent with, for example, Fairchild (2005).
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4 Four-Factor Model of Capital Structure
Now consider the case where all factors are taken into consideration. Note
that when asymmetric information environment includes biased entrepre-
neur, the application of mispricing criterion discussed previously is di¤erent.
Three cases are possible when we compare two di¤erent equilibria using mis-
pricing criterion. One when misricing is objectively greater in one case and
the entrepreneur of underpriced rm understands it. In this case an usual ap-
proach is used and we assume that the equilibrium with objectively minimal
mispricing will dominate (strong dominance). The second case is when ob-
jectively mispricing is equal in both cases but subjectively the entrepreneur
of one rm thinks that one case is better. We use it as a semi-strong form
of dominance as well. Third possible case is when misricing is objectively
greater in one equilibrium but the entrepreneur thinks that it is greater in the
other equilibrium. We suppose that the entrepreneurs view would dominate
in this case (weak dominance).
Below we present an analysis of 4 possible cases. These cases are based
on di¤erent boundary conditions for "h and "l l which are based on Lemma
5 discussed previously.
4.1 Case 1. "h >
(1 p)CXh
B




Consider pooling with d. Non-deviation conditions for each type are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (31)
 (1 
B
offe pXh(1  t) + (1  
off
e )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (32)
 (1 
B
offe pXh(1  t) + (1  
off
e )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t)





)(1  t) C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh+ "h)(1  t) (33)
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p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (34)
(34) holds because "l >
(1 p)CXl
B




  tXh and Xh > Xl.
Consider pooling with e. Non-deviation conditions for each type are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (35)
 (1 
B
pXh(1  t) + (1  )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (36)
 (1 
B
pXh(1  t) + (1  )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t)




Consider a separating equilibrium where h selects e and l selects d. Non-




)(1  t) C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh(1  t)
)p(Xh+ "h)(1  t) (37)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (38)




Finally, consider a separating equilibrium where h selects d and l selects




)(1  t) C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh+ "h)(1  t) (39)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (40)




This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If "h >
(1 p)CXh
B
  tXh, "l >
(1 p)CXl
B
  tXl and in-
formation between entrepreneurs and investors is asymmetric, equilibrium is
pooling with d.
Proof. Follows from above.
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4.2 Case 2. "h >
(1 p)CXh
B




Consider pooling with d. Non-deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (41)
 (1 
B
offe pXh(1  t) + (1  
off
e )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (42)
 (1 
B
offe pXh(1  t) + (1  
off
e )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t)




)(1  t) C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh+ "h)(1  t) (43)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (44)




Consider pooling with e. Non-deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (45)
 (1 
B
pXh(1  t) + (1  )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (46)
 (1 
B
pXh(1  t) + (1  )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t)









)(1  t) C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh(1  t)
)p(Xh+ "h)(1  t) (47)
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p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (48)









)(1  t) C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh+ "h)(1  t) (49)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (50)
(49) holds because Xh > Xl and "h >
(1 p)CXh
B





Proposition 2. If "h >
(1 p)CXh
B
  tXh, "l 
(1 p)CXl
B
  tXl and in-
formation between entrepreneurs and investors is asymmetric, equilibrium is
separating where h selects d and l selects e.
Proof. Follows from above.
4.3 Case 3. "h <
(1 p)CXh
B




Consider pooling with d. Non-deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (51)
 (1 
B
offe pXh(1  t) + (1  
off
e )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (52)
 (1 
B
offe pXh(1  t) + (1  
off
e )pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t)




)(1  t) C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xh+ "h)(1  t) (53)
17
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl(1  t)
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (54)
Then condition (54) holds because "l >
(1 p)CXl
B





The interpretation of this result is that there is a trade-o¤ between ad-




and disadvantages of equity related to low equity value in this equilibrium.
So in order for this equilibrium to exist, h should be si¢ciently overcondent
in order for the rst e¤ect to dominate.




)(1  t) C(1 p)  (1 
B






)(1  t) C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh + (1  )pXl
)p(Xl+ "l)(1  t)
(56)
(55) holds if  is su¢ciently large. To see this note that it holds when
 = 1 because "h <
(1 p)CXh
B




  tXl. When  = 1, (56) becomes
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh






Therefore (56) holds if (58) holds and  is su¢ciently large.
Consider a separating equilibrium where h selects e and l selects d. Non-
deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t) (59)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (60)
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(60) holds if "l >
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)




Consider a separating equilibrium where h selects d and l selects e. Non-
deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t) (61)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (62)




Proposition 3. Consider "h <
(1 p)CXh
B




Xl > Xh(1   t) and let information between entrepreneurs and investors be
asymmetric: 1) if "l >
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)
+Xh  Xl, equilibrium is separating where
h plays e and l plays d; 2) if "l <
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)
+Xh  Xl, and  is su¢ciently
large, equilibrium is pooling with e; 3) If "l <
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)
+Xh  Xl and  is




  tXh, "l >
(1 p)CXl
B




+Xh Xl, equilibrium is separating where h plays e and l plays






+Xl Xh, and  is su¢ciently
low, equilibrium is pooling with d; 3) if "l <
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)
+ Xh   Xl, and  is







+Xl Xh, and  is su¢ciently low, no equilibrium exists.
Proof. Follows from above. Indeed consider Xl > Xh(1   t). Then
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+ Xl   Xh >
(1 p)CXh
B
  tXh so "h <
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+ Xl   Xh. Then
pooling with d does not exist. For other cases we have only one equilibrium
for each case.







Xl   Xh, and  is su¢ciently high, two pooling equilibria exist. However,
mispricing is smaller with pooling with e as follows from the comparison
of RHS (right-hand side) in (55) and LHS (left-hand side) in (53). if "l >
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)
+Xh Xl and "h >
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+Xl Xh, two equilibria exist: separating
where h plays e and l plays d or pooling with d. The former dominates the
latter by mispricing: from h point view, the mispricing is lower in this case
because of "h <
(1 p)CXh
B
  tXh and Lemma 5.
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4.4 Case 4. "h <
(1 p)CXh
B




Consider pooling with d. Non-deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (63)
 (1 
B
offe pXh + (1  
off
e )pXl
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (64)
 (1 
B
offe pXh + (1  
off
e )pXl
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t)
Again, offe = 0. In this case (63) and (64) become:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t) (65)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (66)




Consider pooling with e. Non-deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (67)
 (1 
B
pXh + (1  )pXl
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (68)
 (1 
B
pXh + (1  )pXl
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t)




RHS of (68) increases when  increases. (67) holds if  is su¢ciently large.
20




 = 0, (67) becomes
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t) (69)




Consider a separating equilibrium where h selects e and l selects d. Non-
deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t) (70)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXh
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (71)
(60) holds if "l >
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)
+ Xh   Xl and (70) holds because "h <
(1 p)CXh
B
  tXh. However "l >
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)
+ Xh   Xl is infeasible since "l <
(1 p)CXl
B
  tXl and RHS of the former is gerater than RHS of the latter.
Consider a separating equilibrium where h selects d and l selects e. Non-
deviation conditions are:
p(Xh + "h  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl
)p(Xh + "h)(1  t) (72)
p(Xl + "l  
B
p
)(1  t)  C(1  p)  (1 
B
pXl
)p(Xl + "l)(1  t) (73)
(73) holds because "l <
(1 p)CXl
B












Xh(1 t) and information between entrepreneurs and investors is asymmetric,




  tXh, "l <
(1 p)CXl
B
  tXl, Xl < Xh(1   t)




+Xl  Xh, or if "h >
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+Xl  Xh and  is su¢ciently
large, equilibrium is pooling with e; 2) If "h >
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+Xl  Xh and  is
su¢ciently small, equilibrium is separating where h selects d and l selects e.
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Proof. Follows from above. Indeed consider Xl > Xh(1   t). Then
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+ Xl   Xh >
(1 p)CXh
B
  tXh so "h <
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+ Xl   Xh. Then
the only equilibrium is pooling with e.
Now consider Xl < Xh(1   t). If "h >
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+Xl  Xh, then pooling
with e dominates a separating equilibrium where h plays d and l plays e by
mispricing. If "h <
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+Xl Xh, pooling with e exists if  is su¢ciently
large.
The results of our analysis in Section 4 are summarized in Tables 5 and
6.
Table 5. The model predictions when Xl > Xh(1  t)




















  tXh, "l >
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)




  tXl then separating: are issued;




+Xh  Xl, between debt
 is su¢ciently high and protability;











Table 6. The model predictions when Xl < Xh(1  t)
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  tXh, 1) "l >
(1 p)CXh
B(1 t)




  tXl then separating: are issued;








+Xl  Xh, and protability;
 is su¢ciently low equity is positively
then pooling with d correlated with
2b.  is su¢ciently high macroeconomic situation;






  tXh, "h >
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)




  tXl or "h <
(1 p)CXl
B(1 t)
+Xl  Xh equity is positively
and  is su¢ciently high correlated with





and  is su¢ciently low
separating: h plays d
and l plays e
5 The model implications.





If it does not hold then RHS of conditions determing thresholds for " ("h >
(1 p)CXh
B
  tXh and "l >
(1 p)CXl
B
  tXl) that separate di¤erent cases are
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negative and therefore they hold automatically because "  0.4 Then the only
possible case is case 1 that has very similar predictions to traditional theory.
The interpetation of situation when this conditon does not hold is if tax rate is
too high or bankruptcy cost are too low or rm size is too large. We focus on
the case when (74) holds. Then all four cases considered in previous section
are possible. Note that based on empirical research not all entrepreneurs are
overcondent (Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011)). Secondly we think that
it is more likely when the extent of overcondence of low-quality rm is not
lower than the high-quality rm. Although this has not been tested sofar
but seems to be consistent with the spirit of some ndings in Trinugroho and
Sembel (2011). Therefore we think that empirical predictions of our model
are mostly related to case 3 and case 4.
Let us look closely at the impact of each variable on the outcome of the
model.
Debt and rm size. In the model, rm size is related to variable B. If




  tXl is more likely to hold. If we compare case 3 and case 4,
in case 4 if we assume that each subcase is equally likely, each type of rm
would issue debt with probability 50% (it will issue debt in one case but not
in the other one). In case 3 type h issues debt with probability 50% but type
l will always issue debt in this case. Therefore, the model predicts that as
B increases, more debt will be issued in equilibrium. Empirical literature
usually conrms that debt is postively correlated with rm size. Large rms
have more debt than small rms (eg Frank and Goyal (2009)).
Expected bankruptcy costs and debt. If C increases then the e¤ect is op-
posite to the previous one, i.e case 4 will prevail and debt will be issued less.
As the expected bankruptcy costs increase, the advantages of using equity
increase. This result has several interpretations. Tangible assets su¤er a
smaller loss of value when rms go into distress. Hence, rms with more
tangible assets, such as airplane manufacturers, should have higher leverage
compared to those that have more intangible assets, such as research rms.
Growth rms tend to lose more of their value than non-growth rms when
they go into distress. Hence, the model predicts a negative relationship
between leverage and growth. Empirical evidence by Rajan and Zingales
4We consider a model of start-up rm choice of organizational structure with pessimistic
entrepreneurs (analogous to " < 0 in our model) in Miglo and Brodziak (2019) and a case
of capital structure with pessimistic entrepreneurs is discussed in Miglo (2020).
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(1995), Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2006), and Frank and Goyal (2009)
generally supports the above predictions.
Taxes and debt. The e¤ect of increase in t is similar to that of B described
above. So tax rate is positively correlated with debt. Debt should increase
because higher taxes lead to a greater tax advantage of using debt. Hence,
rms with higher tax rates should have higher debt ratios compared to rms
with lower tax rates. Inversely, rms that have substantial non-debt tax
shields such as depreciation should be less likely to use debt than rms that
do not have these tax shields. If tax rates increase over time, debt ratios
should also increase. Debt ratios in countries where debt has a much larger
tax benet should be higher than debt ratios in countries whose debt has a
lower tax benet.
Note that Graham (1996) nds some support for tax factor. Faulkender
and Smith (2016) discuss tax strategies of international companies. It is
mentioned that multinational groups are using signicantly higher debt in
high-tax jurisdictions, which is consistent with the tax shield idea. Devereux,
Ma¢ni and Xing (2018) nd support for positive correlation between tax rate
and rm debt using condential company-level tax returns for a large sample
of UK rms.
Debt and Protability. A separating equilibrium where high-quality rms
issue equity and low-quality rms issue debt appears more often than one
where high-quality rms issue debt and low-quality rms issue equity. An
implication of this result is that debt and proftability are negatively corre-
lated. This is a new result compared to the traditional pecking-order theory
or behavioral nance literature (Fairchild (2005)).
Empirical studies typically nd a negative relationship between protabil-
ity and leverage (Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995),
Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2007), Vithessonthi and Tongu-
rai (2015), Le and Phan (2017), Mai, Meng and Ye (2017)).
Extent of asymmetric information and debt. In our model, if Xh = Xl,
then, as follows from Table 3, (if we assume, for example, that " is equally
likely to be below or abive the level (1 p)C
B
) debt and equity are equally
likely. When Xh 6= Xl then as we dicsused above, case 3 and case 4 in Table
5 prevail. Also, as we mentioned previously, in case 3 debt dominates equity
on average while in case 4 they are equally likely. So on average debt will
dominate equity meaning that the extent of asymmetric information favors
debt which is consistent with empirical ndings. DMello and Ferris (2000)
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and Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008) md that debt dominates equity
when the extent of asymmetric information is large. Choe, Masulis, and
Nanda (1993) nd that equity issues are more frequent when the economy is
doing well and information asymmetry is low.
Overcondence and debt. In our model overcondence is positively cor-
related with debt. Indeed if " increases, it is more likely that case 3 will
prevail over case 4 and as was previously mentioned, debt will prevail over
equity. This result is generally consistent with empirical ndings such as
Malmendier, Tate and Yanv (2011). Also it follows from the separating
equilibrium analysis that rms with overcondent managers issue more debt
and/or less equity than rms with unbiased managers.
Capital structure and the business cycle. The model predicts that when
the economy is bad ( is low), rms are less likely to issue equity (Case 3
and Case 4). When the economy is booming ( is high), equity issues are
more likely. Empirical work by Choe et al. (1993), Bayless and Chaplinsky
(1996), and Baker and Wurgler (2002), Baum, Stephan and Talavera (2009)
and Zeitun, Temimi and Mimouni (2017) suggests a positive relationship
between equity issues and the business cycle.
Also as follows from case 3, when  is large debt is negatively correlated
with proftability while when it is small, the opposite is true. Recent study
nds, for example, French civil law countries show a positive inuence of
leverage on operating performance when the industry has su¤ered a downturn
(González (2013)).
6 Discussion
This section discusses di¤erent asummptions made in the article, the model
robustness with regard to these assumptions and also possible model exten-
sions and directions for future research.
Di¤erent prot functions. Our focus in this article is to analyze the role
of di¤erent market imperfections and behavioural bias simultaneously. That
is why we adopt a relatively simple project return function. Most of our
results are intuitively sound and will hold if di¤erent prot functions (eg.
with continuous support) are used. It will not, however, a¤ect the results
although it can change some proofs. For example, an equilibrium where
the high-quality type issues equity (case 3) would still exist. If the level of
overcondence of low-quality type is signicantly large then it will not be
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interested in mimicking the high-quality type issuing equity although the
calculations become longer.
The distribution of types. In our model we use two types of rms to il-
lustrate the main ideas. This is also very typical in literature. A natural
question though is whether the results stand if one considers a case with
multiple types. Our analysis shows that most conclusions remain the same.
It is well known, for example, that POT results hold under asymmetric infor-
mation with multiple types (see Myers and Majluf (19884) and Nachman and
Noe (1994)). In the case of multiple types (and assuming that overcondence
level is negatively correlated with a rms quality) one can show that a semi-
separating equilibrium exists with a cut-o¤ level of expected performance
such that all rms with expected performance higher than this level issue eq-
uity and all rms with expected performance lower issue debt. Qualitatively
it has similar interpretations to our main results.
More types of nancing. Introducing additional nancing strategies such
as convertible securities is an interesting direction for future research. Most
results regarding the costs and benets of di¤erent nancing strategies found
in this paper are quite general and do not depend on the introduction of
additional options into the model. The idea holds that if some rms are
run by overcondent managers and some rms are run by rational managers
then overcondent managers would prefer securities that are less sensitive to
future performance since these securities are less penalized by the market
from their point of view. Rational managers would not mind to issue se-
curities that have relative high sensitivity to future performance when they
believe that prices will more or less correctly reect their true values. Under
asymmetric information (unlike the case when all managers are rational) they
would anticipate that overcondent managers (if the level of overcondence
is relatively high) will issue securities with low sensitivity and do not mimic
their strategies.
Moral hazard. In our model we assume that managers act in the interest
of shareholders. One can extend the model by allowing managerial moral
hazard. For example, one can consider a scenario where managerial moral
hazard takes place because a managers equity stake in his rm is reduced
while his individual e¤ort is costly and this cost is not shared. This approach
is very common in nancing literature (starting with Jensen and Meckling
(1976)) and typically creates an agency cost of equity nancing (also see
Fairchild (2005)). This will reduce incentives for high-quality rms to issue
equity in equilibrium. However, there are many di¤erent ways to analyze
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moral hazard issues, for example, to explicitly model a managers level of
e¤ort and its impact on the probability distribution of his rms prot and
respectively how earnings are shared between di¤erent claimholders. This
approach is quite common in contract literature. In nance literature this
approach was used, for example, in Innes (1990). Debt may have its own cost
related to moral hazard issues such as underinvestment and overinvestment
problems for example (see, for example, Myers (1977)). Adding moral hazard
is an interest line for future research.
Behavioural biases exist regarding other variables. Another possible ex-
tension of our research is to analyze the case when entrepreneurs are biased
with regard to not only the project return but, for example, the probability
of project success p. Two points are worth mentioning though. The main
result of our paper, that the combination of four factors (namely asymmetric
information, behavioural bias, tax and bankruptcy costs) leads to a richer set
of predictions compared to traditional theories will not be a¤ected. Quan-
titatively, the results may change though.
7 Conclusion.
This article presents a new capital structure model based on four factors well
documented in literature: asymmetric information, taxes, bankruptcy costs
and decision-makers overcondence. The model can simultaneously explain
several facts about capital structure including those that remain puzzling
from existing theories point of view eg negative correlation between debt
and protability; why rms issue equity etc. Unlike many advanced research
on capital structure, a closed-form solution is obtained for most results.
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